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Abstract 
Abstract of the thesis titled: 
Consumption Externalities and Capital Externalities 
Submitted by ZHOU Yu 
for the degree of Mater of Philosophy in Economics 
at the Chinese University of Hong Kong in July 2004. 
In this thesis, we consider the one-sector neoclassical growth models with consumption 
and/or capital externalities. The externalities are modeled by assuming that the 
production functions and/or the discount rates depend on average consumption and/or 
average capital. 
We study three issues. First, we examine the dynamic properties of a one-sector 
neoclassical growth model with both consumption externalities and capital externalities. 
We show that in the presence of both kinds of externalities the perfect-foresight 
equilibrium may not be unique, and that local indeterminacy can arise. 
Second, we investigate how average consumption (society consumption) affects 
individual consumption levels. We find that how consumption externalities affect 
individual consumption levels depends on whether average consumption is included in 
the felicity function or in the discounting function. 
Third, we analyze the effects of capital externalities on long-run productions, and find 
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1 Introduction 
This thesis explores the effects of consumption externalities and capital exter-
nalities. We consider extensions of the one-sector neoclassical growth models 
with optimizing infinitely-lived agents by assuming that the production func-
tion and/or the discount rate depend on economy-wide average consumption 
and/or average capital.i 
Several recent papers model externalities by including average consump-
tion and/or average capital (or average income) in the discount rate. For 
example, Shi (1999) postulates that the individual discount rate relies on 
average consumption habit, and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003) place av-
erage felicity in the discount-rate function in a model with endogenous labor 
supply. Ogawa (1993) estimates a model where the discount rate is assumed 
to depend on average labor income. Drugeon (1998) considers a model with 
the discount rate depending on individual and average consumption, while 
Drugeon (1996a) and Palivos, etc. (1997) study models by specifying depen-
dences of individual discount rates on individual consumption and average 
capital holdings. 
^Or the aggregate values of these variables with a population of unit mass. We will 
thus use the words "average" and "aggregate" interchangeably henceforth. 
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In addition, including average capital in the production function is widely 
used in the literatures. See, for example, Homer (1986)，Boldrin and Rusti-
chini (1994)，Kehoe (1991). Having average consumption in the production 
function is also used by some authors. See, for example, Drugeon (1998), 
Kehoe, Levine and Romer (1992). 
The thesis is focused on three issues. First, we examine the dynamic 
properties of a one-sector neoclassical growth model with both consump-
tion externalities and capital externalities. We show that in the presence 
of both kinds of externalities the perfect-foresight equilibrium may not be 
unique, and that local indeterminacy can arise. Second, we investigate how 
average consumption (society consumption) affects individual consumption 
levels. We find that how consumption externalities affect individual con-
sumption levels depends on whether average consumption is included in the 
felicity function or in the discounting function. Third, we analyze the effects 
of capital externalities on long-run productions, and find that larger capital 
externalities do not necessarily lead to higher long-run output levels. 
The structure of this thesis is as follows. In Section 2 we examine the 
first issue, and set up a general model in which both the production function 
and the discount rate are subject to externalities from average consump-
2 
tion and average capital. Then two specific cases and an extension to that 
general model are investigated. We show that in the presence of both ex-
ternalities the prefect-foresight eqilibrium may not be unique, and that local 
indeterminacy can arise. These therefore describe a new class of models with 
indeterminacy. In Section 3 we investigate how average consumption affects 
individual consumption levels of both short-run and long-run. We find that 
how consumption externalities affect individual consumption levels depends 
on whether average consumption is included in the felicity function or in 
the discounting function. If average consumption is incorporated into the 
felicity function, jealousy (positive consumption externalities) may induce 
the agent to consume more in the short-run and leads to a higher level of 
individual consumption in the long-run. However, when incorporating av-
erage consumption into the rate of time preference, we show that although 
jealousy induces the agent to consume more in the short-run, it leads to a 
lower level of individual consumption in the long-run. In Section 4 we an-
alyze the effects of capital externalities on long-run productions. First, we 
investigate a case with a separable felicity function, and show that when the 
production function is subject to positive externalities from average labor 
input in the production function, larger externalities from average capital do 
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not necessarily lead to higher long-run output levels; while when the pro-
duction function is subject to non-positive externalities from average labor 
input, larger externalities from average capital normally lead to higher long-
run output levels. However, if the felicity function is non-separable, the effect 
of capital externalities on long-run output levels is determined by the magni-
tude of capital externalities, and is qualitively unrelated to labor externalities 
in the production function. In Section 5 we offer the concluding remarks. 
2 Dynamics of A One-sector Growth Model 
with Consumption and Capital Externali-
ties 
2.1 A General Model 
In this model, we assume that the rate of time preference depends on both 
average levels of consumption and capital, and the production function used 
here is also affected by these two kinds of externalities. We consider an exten-
sion of the one-sector neoclassical growth models with optimizing infinitely-
lived agents. The economy is assumed to be made up of a large number of 
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identical agents, normalized to unity, and each of them seeks to maximize 
the present discounted value of his/her lifetime utility. 
/•oo � i‘t -
Uo= u(ct) exp - / p{Cv,Ky)dv dt (1) 
Jo I Jo . 
where q is the representative agent's consumption, Cy is the economy-wide 
average level of consumption, Ky is the economy-wide average level of capital, 
and p(Cv, Ky) is the instantaneous rate of time preference. 
Assumption 1: (1) u{c) is strictly positive and strictly concave, that 
is, u > 0, u' > 0, u" < 0 ; (2) /9 > 0 and is a function of both average 
consumption and average capital. 
In fact, this thesis is not the only nor the first attempt to model in-
dividual time preference that is socially determined. As mentioned in the 
introduction, Shi (1999) postulates that the individual discount rate relies 
on average consumption habit, and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003) place av-
erage felicity in the discount-rate function in a model with endogenous labor 
supply. Ogawa (1993) estimates a model where the discount rate is assumed 
to depend on average labor income. Drugeon (1998) considers a model with 
the discount rate depending on individual and average consumption, while 
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Drugeon (1996a) and Palivos, etc. (1997) study models by specifying depen-
dences of individual discount rates on individual consumption and average 
capital holdings.^ Here we assume the individual time preference depends on 
both average levels of consumption and capital. 
Assumption 2: The single good is assumed to be produced with a tech-
nology F{k,l,C, K) that uses capital k and labor I as inputs, and is affected 
by externalities from both consumption and capital. The production function 
F{k, I, C, K) > 0 exhibits constant returns to scale in k and I, and is concave. 
As mentioned in the introduction, many authors include average con-
sumption or average capital in the production functions. For example, Ke-
hoe (1991), Kehoe, Levine and Romer (1992)，Boldrin and Rustichini (1994), 
Drugeon (1998). Here, we consider a model in which the production function 
is affected by externalities from both consumption and capital. 
Denoting the intensive form for the production function as /(/c, C, K)= 
F{k, 1，C, K) and assuming f is twice differentiable, we have 
Mk,C,K)>0, (2) 
^ While recognizing its analytical simplicity, these authors do not elaborate on the 
economic implications of the assumption that the rate of the time preference depends 
on average or aggregate variables. In a broad context, models with socially-determined 
time preference are related to the recent literature known as "social economics", which 
emphasizes the role of social influence on individual preference and cognition. 
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where fi denotes partial derivative with respect to ith argument. For analytic 
simplicity, we further assume the capital depreciation rate and the population 
growth rate to be zero. The agent, given ko, chooses paths for consumption 
Ct’ to maximize (1)，subject to the budget constraint 
kt = f (kt ,Ct,Kt)-Ct (3) 
To solve this dynamic optimization problem, we formulate the present-
value Hamiltonian as follows 
H = u(ct) exp [ - I p{C们 Ky)dv\ + [fih, C^ I<t) — c j (4) 
.Jo . 
where /i^  is the present-value cost ate variable or shadow price. Although 
the rate of time preference is non-constant, it depends only on average levels, 
which are taken as exogenously given by the representative agent. First-order 
conditions are (in eqilibrium, individual and average variables are identical, 
that is, Ky = ky^ Cy = Cy) 
w'(Q)exp - p{cy,ky)dv = fit (5) 
.Jo . 
7 
At =-"t/i(、，Cf，、） (6) 
along with the transversality condition. Defining a new costate variable, 
Xt = jJLt exp /q p{cy, ky)dv，the first-order conditions (5) and (6) become 
Act) = Xt (7) 
(8) 
At l^t 
^ c . = # (9) 
u'{Ct) At 
The system can be reduced to the following two differential equations 
Ct = ^ l p ( c t , k t ) - M k u c t , k ) ] (10) 
u"{Ct) 
h = f{Kcukt) - Ct (11) 
where equation (10) is the intertemporal Euler equation, and equation (11) 
is the resource constraint. We note first from equations (10) and (11) that 
in this growth model there may exist one or multiple steady states (It is also 
possible that there exists no steady state). Below we assume that there exists 
at least one steady state, and denote the steady stead generally as (c*, k*), 
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which could be determined by the condition Ct = h = 0. By linearizing the 
system around the steady state, we obtain 
Ct 织P 1 - / 1 2 ) - fu - /13) 
= (12) 
kt \ [ / 2 - I /1 + /3 J [kt-k* 
where pj denotes partial derivative with respect to jth. argument. The trace 
and the determinant of the Jacobian matrix of the above linearized system 
are given by 
tr 二 ^ ( P i - / i 2 ) + (/i + /3) (13) 
det =各 [ (外一 /i2)(/i + /3) —（P2 — / l l — / l 3 ) ( / 2 — 1)] (14) 
Since the system contains only one predetermined variable, kt, the prefect-
foresight eqilibrium is locally indeterminate if both eigenvalues of the matrix 
have negative real parts. Since the trace equals the sum of its eigenvalues and 
the determinant their product, requiring negative eigenvalues is equivalent to 
requiring that the determinant be positive and the trace negative. We thus 
have the following result. 
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Proposition 1: If evaluated at a steady state, 
> i - f l 2 ) + (fl+/3)<0 (15) 
and 
(Pl - / l 2 ) ( / l + fs) — (P2 一 f n - / l 3 ) ( / 2 - 1 ) < 0 ( 1 6 ) 
then the eqilihria near the steady state are indeterminate. 
In Proposition 1, under conditions (15) and (16), first-order conditions 
and the transversality condition are not sufficient to determine a unique so-
lution path. Indeterminacy of this sort implies that the rational expectation 
eqilibria involve random variables, unrelated to the economy's fundamentals, 
simply because agents believe it to be so. 
2.2 Case 1: p = p{K), and f = f { k , C) 
In this subsection, we consider a specific case in which the instantaneous 
discount rate depends solely on average capital, and the production function 
has only consumption externalities. The reason why we consider this spe-
cific case is that the kind of production function which is subject to only 
consumption externalities is not extensively studied in literatures. We show 
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that local indeterminacy can occur in this case. The maximization problem 
faced by the representative agent is 
/•oo � ft -
max / u{ct) exp - / p{Ky)dv dt (17) 
Jo L Jo . 
subject to 
k = f{kt,Ct)-ct (18) 
The general system given by equations (10) and (11) is then specified into 
the following two dynamic equations, 
h = f{kt,Ct) — (k 
By linearization around the steady state, the above dynamic system can then 
be written by 
= (19) 
kt J [ / 2 - I fi J 
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The trace and the determinant are 
tr 二 - 4 / i 2 + h (20) u" 
det 二 ^ [ - / i 2 / i - ( p ' - / i i ) ( / 2 - l ) ] (21) 
It is easy to see that the following pair of conditions are necessary for inde-
terminacy, 
/i2 < 0 (22) 
-fi2 fi - {p' - / i i)( /2 - 1) < 0 (23) 
where f u = ^ ^ = ^ ^ < 0 (in eqilibrium, individual and average variables 
are identical) implies that the higher the average consumption level, the less 
the private marginal product of capital. 
We now give an example for this case. 
Example 1 ： Let the felicity, production and discounting functions be 
u{ct) = 1 - e-叫. 
f{kt,Ct) = k^C! 
12 
p{Kt) = aKt^P 
where cr > 0, and 0 < ^ < 1. The trace and the determinant of the Jacobian 
matrix are given by 
tr = � i ( £ + F t ^ ) (24) 
(7 
det = + + (25) 
(7 
One necessary condition for indeterminacy is e < 0 from the above trace 
equation (24), which implies average consumption has negative externali-
ties on output. Also, it is easy to see that the smaller the intertemporal 
elasticity in consumption a is, the easier it is to have indeterminacy. This 
is because indeterminacy arises when we consider constructing an alterna-
tive eqilibrium with higher investment rate we must initially curtail con-
sumption, and the magnitude of a is inversely related to the agent's de-
sire to intertemporally smooth consumption. Another necessary condition is 
[—/12/1 — {p' — / i i ) ( /2 — 1)] < 0, and we thus can show that indeterminacy 
is more likely to occur under a large steady-state value of capital. Normally 
there exist two steady states, of which the smaller one is a saddle point, 
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whereas the larger one is indeterminate. A simple parameterized example is 
e a p e a 
0.3 -0.001 0.055 -0 .1 0.039 
in which there exist two steady states. The smaller one {k* = 17.4) is a 
saddle point, whereas the larger one {k* = 29) is indeterminate. 
Type/value of steady state p* k* c* y* 
Indeterminate eqilibrium 0.02 29 2.5 2.5 
Saddle point eqilibrium 0.03 17.4 2.18 2.18 
It is necessary for us to mention a related model in which the rate of 
time preference depends on accumulated wealth, instead of K, just as in 
Fukao and Hamada (1991), that is, as a nation accumulates wealth, the rate 
of time preference declines down to a certain point and increases thereafter. 
Following Fukao and Hamada's prediction, if we assume the discount rate 
depends on the economy-wide average level of wealth S^ ^ which is equal 
^In order to follow Fukao and Hamada's prediction, p is assumed quadratic in 5 , i.e., 
p{S) = a + + 识、a > 0, /3 < 0, 7 > 0. Since p'{S) = 27^ + /3 and < 0, 7 > 0, 
sufficiently large S could cause p'{S) > 0’ which implies that the rate of time preference 
increases with the increase of S\ sufficiently small S may cause p'{S) < 0，which implies 
that the rate of time preference decreases with the increase of S. 
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to the average output and is a function of K, and the production has no 
externalities, we can easily show that indeterminacy is impossible to occur 
in this kind of model. 
2.3 Case 2: p = K), and f = f { k ) 
In this part, we assume the rate of time preference depends on both average 
consumption and average capital, while the production has no externalities. 
The reason why we consider this specific case is that the kind of discounting 
rate which is subject to both average consumption and average capital is 
not extensively studied in literatures. We then characterize conditions under 
which local indeterminacy can arise. The maximization problem faced by 
the agent is 
roo � ft -
max / u{ct) exp — / p{Cv^ Ky)dv dt (26) 
Jo L Jo ‘ -
subject to 
kt = f{kt) - Ct (27) 
The general system given by equations (10) and (11) is then specified into 
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the following two dynamic equations, 
4 = 諧 [ " ( “ ) - 綱 
k = f{k) - Ct 
By linearization around the steady state, the above dynamic system can then 
be written by 
‘ 1 f 細 - n ] [ q - C * 1 
= (此） 
k J - 1 f [ kt- k* 
The trace and the determinant of the Jacobian matrix are given by 
tr = ^ P i ^ f (29) 
det = ^ { p , f ' + p , - n (30) 
It is easy to see that for indeterminacy (negative trace and positive determi-
nant), we need the following pair of necessary conditions. 
Pi > 0 (31) 
16 
P2<0 (32) 
Pi 二髮二 蕩〉 0 (in eqilibrium, individual and average variables are identi-
cal) specifies dependence of the individual rate of time preference on average 
consumption. High average consumption induces the agent to be more impa-
tient toward future consumption. With the additional condition u � 0 , high 
average consumption reduces the agent's utility and hence induces him/her 
to consume more. P2 = §§ ~ Wk ^ ^ says that the individual rate of time 
preference falls with the level of the economy's living standard. One could 
think that individual attitude towards weighing present versus future hap-
piness is largely influenced by the society. The society's valuation of future 
utility, in turn, increases with its living standard. Why does indeterminacy 
become possible when /q^  > 0 and p2 < 0? Let's consider starting from an 
eqilibrium path, but let the agent believe that there is an eqilibrium in which 
the shadow price of investment is higher than its current value. If the agent 
acts on this belief, the higher current price of investment reduces consump-
tion in order for the agent to invest more. Prom the Euler equation (10), 
however, a reduction in consumption causes a fall in the shadow price of cap-
ital, and investment will eventually fall as well. The economy then returns 
to its original steady state along this new eqilibrium path. 
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Next we give a concrete example for this case. 
Example 2: We spell out the discounting, felicity and production func-
tions as follows. 
p{Ct, Kt) 二 o a - 风 + 7 
u{ct) = 1 - e - � 
m) = 
where a, ^ > 0, 0 < ^ < 1. The trace and the determinant of the Jacobian 
matrix are given by 
tr = � + 歲 
a 
det = - + AOie - + 
a 
With necessary conditions a = p^ > 0 and —(3 = p2 < indeterminacy arises 
when P2 — f" < 0, and for sufficiently large k*, which can be solved from 
A 服 - Aak*^ + jdk* = 7. Normally there exist two steady states, of which 
the smaller one is a saddle point, whereas the larger one is indeterminate. A 
18 
simple parameterized example is 
A 9 a p 7 a 
0.3 0.3 0.004 0.005 0.08 0.28 
in which there exist two steady states. The smaller one {k* = 1) is a saddle 
point, whereas the larger one {k* = 14) is indeterminate. 
Type/value of steady state p* k* c* y* 
Indeterminate eqilibrium 0.01 14 0.66 0.66 
Saddle point eqilibrium 0.07 1 0.3 0.3 
2.4 Extension 1: A Model with Endogenous Popula-
tion 
In this subsection, we consider an extension of the previous general model, 
and investigate a model in which the population growth rate n is assumed 
to be determined by average capital. The intuition is that average capital 
has some negative effect on the population growth rate, that is, the richer 
a society is, the smaller a population growth rate the society experiences. 
Furthermore, we assume the discount rate depends solely on average con-
19 
sumption while the production is subject to no externalities. We show that 
indeterminacy can occur in this model. The representative agent maximizes 
his/her lifetime utility, given by 
I'OO � ft -
/ u{ct) exp — / p{Cy)dv dt (33) 
Jo L Jo . 
subject to 
k = f{kt) - n{Kt)kt - ct (34) 
where n{Kt) is the population growth rate. 
Assumption 4: (1) u(c) is strictly positive and strictly concave, that is, 
u > 0, u' > 0, u" < 0; (2) f{k) is strictly positive and concave, that is, / > 0, 
f > 0, f" < 0; (3) p > 0 and is linear in C, which is p = aC + /?, a > 0; (4) 
n'{K) < 0，which captures the intuition that a richer economy experiences a 
lower population growth rate; (5) the capital depreciation rate J is simplified 
to be zero. 
Setting up the present-value Hamiltonian as 
H = u(ct) exp — I p{Cy)dv + …[f{kt) — n{Kt)kt - q] (35) 
-Jo -
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and solving the agent's maximization problem yields the following first-order 
conditions 
u'{ct)exp - f p(cy)dv = fit (36) 
.Jo . 
= inkt ) -n {k t ) ] (37) 
Defining a new costate variable, \ = fh exp Jq p{cy)dv , the first-order con-
ditions become 
. u'{ct) = Xt 
Af At I , � 
At fh 
u'(ct) t Xt 
The system can be reduced to two dynamic differential equations for Ct 
and kt, 
= + p + (38) 
k = f{h) - n{kt)kt - Ct (39) 
The steady-state solutions for k* can be solved out from the following two 
equations 
ac* + ^ + n(k*) = f(k*) (40) 
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f{k*) - n(k*)k* = c* (41) 
Linearizing (38) and (39) around the steady state, we have 
匕 t $ [n'[k*) - f"] cH-c* 
= (42) 
k —1 f - n{k*) - n'{k*)k* kt-k* 
The trace and the determinant of the Jacobian matrix are given by 
tr = + [/ ' - n{k*) - n'{k*)k*] (43) 
u 
det = [ / ' - n{k*) - n\k*)k*] + [n'{k*) - / � ] } (44) 
UL 
Note that indeterminacy requires the determinant to be positive and the 
trace negative. We thus have the following result on indeterminacy 
Proposition 2: If evaluated at a steady state, 
^a + [f - n(k*) - n'(k*)k*] < 0 (45) 
u" 
and 
a [/' - n(k*) - n'(k*)k*] + [n ' (r ) - / " ] < 0 (46) 
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then the eqilibria near the steady state are indeterminate. 
We next give three examples in which Proposition 2 holds. 
Example 3: Let the felicity, population growth-rate and production func-
tions be, u{c) = 1 - e—沉’ n{K) = e一办厂+“’ f{k) = Ak, where a > 0, 6 > 0 
and yi > 0. Substituting these functions into (42), we obtain 
Ct -这 b -bk*+rj Ct-C* 
= " (47) 
kt - 1 - (1 _ 6 / c * ) e - 肥 k t - k * 
The trace and the determinant of the Jacobian matrix are 
tr = - - + A - ( l - …1 (48) 
a 
det = - i { a [ A - i l - 6/c*)e-紀+” — 6 e - � + " } (49) 
Normally there exist two steady states, of which the smaller one is indeter-
minate, whereas the larger one is a saddle point. A simple parameterized 
example is 
A a P (J h 7] 
0.03 0.05 0.005 0.45 0.6 0.02 
in which there exist two steady states. The smaller one {k* = 6) is indeter-
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minate, where p* is valued at around 0.005 and n* around 0.02. 
Example 4： Let u{c) = (1 - where 0 < cj < 1, and all the other 
functions and assumptions remain the same as Example 3. The trace and 
the determinant of the Jacobian matrix are 
tr = - - C * + U - (1 - 6A;*)e-诚*+”l (50) 
a 
det = - - {a \A-(1- 诚 - foe—诚*+”} (51) 
a 
One can note that the only difference between equations (50) and (48) is 
that c* enters the first item of equation (50) and the equation (51) is just 
what equation (49) multiplied by c*. If all the other parameter values are the 
same (regardless of the a values in two examples), the steady-state solutions 
are identical to those in Example 3, and so are their properties. That is, the 
smaller steady state is indeterminate, whereas the larger one is a saddle point. 
Despite these similarities, indeterminacy requires very small values of a or 
close to the linear felicity function. This is so because for small steady-state 
value of k*, c* is also small. Unlike Example 3，here c* enters the expression 
for the trace, and in order for the trace to be negative, a must be sufficiently 
small. As a numerical example, indeterminacy occurs only when a is close 
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to 0.006 for other parameter values given in Example 3. 
Example 5: Now let n{K) = bjK + r], where 6 > 0, and all the other 
functions and assumptions remain the same as Example 4. The trace and 
the determinant of the Jacobian matrix are 
tr = - - c * + (A-77) (52) 
a 
= f + ^ (53) 
Also there normally exist two steady states, of which the smaller one is inde-
terminate, whereas the larger one is a saddle point. A simple parameterized 
example is 
A Oi p a b 7] 
0.09 0.35 0.005 0.1 0.1 0.02 
in which there exist two steady states. The smaller one (/c* = 1.75) is inde-
terminate, where p* is valued at around 0.01 and n* around 0.07. 
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3 Consumption Externalities and Individual 
Consumption 
In this section, we turn to another issue and explore the effects of positive 
consumption externalities, which catches the property of jealousy, on both 
short-run and long-run individual consumption levels. In fact, consumption 
externalities have been extensively studied in jealousy models. For example, 
Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000) analyze the impact of consumption externalities 
on the effect of short-run macroeconomic stabilization policy. Abel (1990, 
1999) studies the effect of consumption externalities on asset pricing and the 
equity premium. Fernando Alverez and Urban Jermann (2000) consider the 
implication of consumption externalities for the cost of business cycles. 
More related to the issues addressed in this section is the idea that the 
happiness of an individual depends upon the consumption of others. The 
fact that agents interact with one another makes it inevitable that their con-
sumption choices are likely to influence one another directly. Researchers 
have long been aware of this phenomenon. For example, Dupor and Liu 
(2002) define different forms of consumption externalities and explored their 
relationship with long-run overconsumption. In their paper, Dupor and Liu 
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delineate two effects that consumption externalities may have, one of which 
is jealousy, and prove that jealousy implies that the laissez faire equilibrium 
(long-run) consumption level is greater than the social optimal level. This 
thesis is related to that paper, but extends its static analysis to dynamic 
analysis by exploring the effects of consumption externalities on both short-
run and long-run individual consumption levels. We define two specifications 
of consumption externalities in this thesis, the first of which follows Dupor 
and Liu (2002). For the second specification, we incorporate consumption 
externalities into the rate of time preference. We compare the effects of con-
sumption externalities on individual consumption levels in these two spec-
ifications both in short-run and long-run, and find that although jealousy 
(positive consumption externalities) induces the agent to be more impatient 
towards future consumption and thus to consume more in the short-run in 
both specifications, in the long-run, however, the effects are different in these 
two specifications. 
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3.1 The Felicity Function Depending on Average Con-
sumption 
The economy is assumed to be made up of a large number of identical agents, 
normalized to unity. When average consumption is incorporated into the 
felicity function, the optimization problem of the representative agent is de-
scribed by 
roo 
max / •,CtJt)e—Ptdt (54) 
Jo 
subject to 
kt = f ( k u l t ) - c t (55) 
where It is the individual labor input.^ 
Assumption 6: (1) u(c, C, I) = - 01, a > 0, & > 0, and a > 0-
(2) f{k,l) = AkH\ ^ > 0 , 0 < a < l , 0 < 6 < 1 , a + h= 1; (3) p is a positive 
constant. 
In Dupor and Liu (2002), the felicity function takes the form of u[c, x, n), 
where c, x ^ O , O ^ n ^ l respectively denoting individual consumption, per 
capita consumption and individual labor input. According to their definition, 
''Here the labor supply is endogenous. If the labor supply is fixed, one can show that 
average consumption has no effects on either short-run or long-run consumption level. 
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if Ux < 0, then preferences exhibit jealousy. Here, the assumption of o： > 0 
characterizes this jealousy property. 
In Dupor and Liu's static model, there is no capital accumulation, i.e., 
the capital input in the production function is assumed fixed. We now extend 
their static analysis to dynamic analysis by exploring a dynamic model with 
capital accumulation and investigating the effects of consumption external-
ities on individual consumption levels of both short-run and long-run. We 
show that in the long-run (at the steady state), jealousy leads to a higher 
level of individual consumption. However, in the short-run (out of the steady 
state), the effect is ambiguous. 
To solve the above optimization problem, we formulate the current-value 
Hamiltonian as follows 
B = (Ct - ⑶ 一 ei, + - Ct) (56) 
1 - (J 
The system can be described by the following two differential equations 
c. 二 • ( 孕 ) 占 ( 1 - 我 弾 c 戶 (57) 
a u _ 
h = (58) 
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By linearization around the steady state, we have 
_ "1 � "1 r -1 
Cf Jll Jl2 Ct- c* 
. = (59) 
h J21 J22 kt - k* 
匕 J L J L 一 
where 
T A 、•：iSJi/ ，、 ..''-l-Tb 
Jll = —Aa{—) 1 - ' ' ( 1 - a ) i - f - {-ab)c 1 - ' ) 
Jl2 = 0 
J21 =碎卢(1 - - 1 
7 A f h -ah ... -ah 
J22 = ) (1 — a) c ~ 
u 
The determinant of the Jacobian matrix is given by 
det = (-a6)A2( j ) 口 ( 1 - a ) 口 < 0 (60) 
Since the determinant is always negative, the steady state is a saddle point. 
At the steady state, we obtain 
( 广 = 补 (61) 
H ^ 丄一Q； 
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By differentiating c* with respect to a in equation (61), we have 
— = 一 〉 Q (62) 
da p 9 
Since dc*/da > 0, we can show that larger a leads to larger c*, which im-
plies that the more jealous an individual, the higher the level of individual 
consumption in the long-run. 
For the short-run analysis, we solve the above linearized system (59) and 
obtain the corresponding two eigenvalues 
Ai = )~ (1 - a) —c*— < 0 
U 
u 
The saddle path equation is 
Ai - J22 J . ( * 入 1 - …、 
ct = 二 -——h + (c - /c ) (63) 
J21 <^21 
The slope of the saddle path is 
入 1 —知 = P ( a b + 1 ) 
J21 ~ a(ab+l) V ) 
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The intercept of the saddle path is 
c + (65) 
We thus have the following proposition. 
Proposition 3: If a < cr, in the short-run jealousy induces the agent 
to consume more, and in the long-run jealousy still leads to a higher level of 
individual consumption. 
The details of the result in Proposition 3 is illustrated in Figure 1 of the 
Appendix. 
The possible reason for the result in Proposition 3 may be that the rel-
atively large value of cr, whose magnitude is inversely related to the agent's 
desire to intertemporally smooth consumption, induces the agent to keep 
his/her short-run consumption habit till long-run. 
3.2 The Discount Rate Depending on Average Con-
sumption 
In this subsection, we exploit another specification of consumption externali-
ties. We incorporate average consumption into the discount rate and assume 
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the representative agent solves the following maximization problem 
roo r /"t -
max / u{ct) exp 一 / p{Cy)dv dt (66) 
Jo L Jo -
subject to 
h = f{kt) - Ct (67) 
Assumption 5: (1) u(c) is strictly positive and strictly concave, that is, 
u > 0, u' > 0, u" < 0; (2) f{k) is strictly positive and concave, that is, / � 0 ’ 
f > 0，f" and p = aC +(5, a > 0. 
Since a > 0, the rate of time preference increases with average consump-
tion, that is, as the society consumes more, the agent becomes even more 
impatient and is less willing to defer consumption. Under the additional 
assumption of n > 0, o; > 0 implies that average consumption reduces the 
agent's lifetime utility, so it represents one kind of specification of jealousy 
property.^ As mentioned in the previous subsection, Dupor and Liu define 
the jealousy as Ux < 0, where a: ^ 0, denoting per capita consumption. Here 
we provide an alternative definition of jealousy, i.e., p^ = a > The com-
mon in these two kinds of definition is that the higher average consumption 
r)See Shi (1999) about this point. 
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level induces the individual agent to consume more. 
The present-value Hamiltonian is given by 
H = u(ct) exp - / p(Cv)dv 十 //力[f{h) - Ct] 
.Jo . 
The dynamic system is 
Q = (68) 
k = f{kt) - Ct (69) 
At the steady state we have 
+ = (70) 
m ) = c* (71) 
Then k* can be solved out from the following equation 
= (72) 
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By linearization around the steady state, we obtain the following system 
• "1 r" n � — 
^ 杀 h / ’ * ) ] c^-c* 
= 〔叫 
k -1 f'm kt 一 k* 
• J L J J 
The trace and the determinant of the Jacobian matrix are 
tr = + 
det = 丢 - / � ( F ) ] < 0 (74) 
The determinant is always negative, which implies that there exists a unique 
solution path, and indeterminacy can not occur. 
By differentiating c* with respect to k* in equation (71), and differenti-
ating k* with respect to a in equation (72), we obtain 
^ 一 /'(於”刺 < 0 (75) 
Since dc*/da < 0，we can show that larger a leads to smaller c*, which 
implies that the more jealous an individual, the lower the level of individ-
ual consumption in the long-run. The result here is different from that of 
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subsection 3.1，where the more jealous an individual, the higher the level of 
individual consumption in the long-run. 
For the short-run analysis, we draw Figure 2 in the Appendix. We can 
prove that jealousy induces the representative agent to consume more in the 
short-run. This short-run result is the same as that of Proposition 3. 
4 Capital Externalities and Long-run Produc-
tions 
In the last part of this thesis, we turn to the third issue and analyze the 
long-run effect of capital externalities on output levels. We investigate two 
models in this section. In subsection 4.1, we consider one case with a sep-
arable utility function, and in subsection 4.2 we consider another case with 
a non-separable utility function. Furthermore, we include labor externalities 
in line with many other models in the literature. We show that in the model 
with a separable utility function,® when the production is subject to positive 
externalities from average labor input in the economy, larger externalities 
''Our results in subsection 4.1 are mostly based on examples because of the complexity of 
mathematical proof. Although the lack of clear mathematical proof, results are creditable 
to most extent. 
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from average capital do not necessarily lead to higher long-run output lev-
els, while when the production is subject to non-positive externalities from 
average labor input, larger externalities from average capital normally lead 
to higher long-run output levels. However, when the felicity function is non-
separable, the effect of capital externalities on output levels is determined by 
the magnitude of capital externalities, and is qualitively unrelated to labor 
externalities in the production function. 
4.1 A Model with a Separable Felicity Function 
The economy is assumed to be made up of a large number of identical agents, 
normalized to unity, and the optimization problem of the representative agent 
is described by 
roo _l-cr 7I+X 
蘭 / ( T ^ - T ^ ) e 力 力 （76) 
subject to 
kt == k 汗r^Ktq^ — Ct (77) 
where Lt is the economy-wide average level of labor input. 
Assumption 7: (1) 0 < cr < 1; (2) % > 0 is the intertemporal elasticity 
in labor supply; (3) 0 < a < 1, 0 < 1 - a < 1； (4) p > 0 and is a positive 
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constant] (5) e is the externality from average capital in production, and rj is 
the externality from average labor in production. 
We construct the current-value Hamiltonian as 
广 l-a il+X 
H = - + A. — q) (78) 
丄一（J i X 
First-order conditions are (in eqilibrium Kt = 知 山 = k ) 
¥ = 广—" (79) 
入t 
cr 二 Xt (80) 
If = At(l - " (81) 
together with the goods market clearing condition 
kt = k，'〖 i产 -a — Ct (82) 
and the transversality condition. Then the system can be described by the 
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following two differential equations 
= ^ a ( l - 计 a-" kt 竹 - p (83) 
C I J 
i_u’，„ -<T(l+7f-a) (a-\-€){l+v~a)丨丨 
k = (84) 
At the steady state, we obtain 
2/* = c* 二 ^k* (85) 
k* = i + x k ’ � — ( 8 6 ) 
y* = 細 D 卞 1+加} “ " 5 ’ (87) 
a 
where for simplicity, we define 
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B = ( _ ^广 ( i _ « ) + ( x + … . ( 1 > 0 a 1 — a 
D = 
1 — a 
E = (cr + x ) ( l - Q ! ) > 0 
By linearization around the steady state, we obtain 
r n "1 � -
Ct Jl\ Jl2 Ct - C* 
. 二 (88) 
kt J21 J22 kf — /c* 
- J L J L -> 
where 
Ju = — -a{l — ajx+c-vc x+o-v k x+oc-n T T 
CT L x + . 
二 £ ： [ ( … + … 一 
cr L X + ^-V . 
•Q;(1 — Oi) X+O'-V C X+O'-V K X+oc-v 
J21 = ^ -(1 — a) X+O'-V C X+o-V k X+«-” 丁丁 一 1 
X + Oi-r] 
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J22 = — - + a + £ (l-a)x+^-vc x+a-7, k 十十 
L x-^^-v 
The trace and the determinant of the Jacobian matrix are given by 
tr = Jll + J22 (89) 
det = J11J22 — J12J21 (90) 
It is easy to prove the following necessary condition for indeterminacy^ 
X + (91) 
which is identical to the condition in Benhabib and Farmer (1994), that is, 
77 + (1 - a ) � 1 + X (92) 
By differentiating y* with respect to e in equation (87), we have 
^ = [邮〒 i + x k ’ } “ ) - " ] . \n{BD^) • - ( 1 + 力 2 (93) 
de a ^ J � y [£(1 +力+ � ( 1 _ …-丑] 2 � ) 
^Here we assume externalities from average capital in production, e, are positive. 
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4.1.1 Case 1:7^ = 0 
rj 二 Q means that there exist no externalities from labor input in production. 
Equation (93) can then be rewritten by 
^ = . i n B — — - ( 1 + 力 , (94) 
de a^ ) [£(1 + X)-丑]2 
The first term is positive, and the third term is negative. The sign of dy*/de 
is then determined by that of lii-B. 
In 5 = In [(芒广(i-«)+(x外…. 
a 1 — a 
• -J 
where a(l - a) + (x + a) > 0 and > 1. Furthermore, we assume 
^ < 1 and thus 0 < < 1.8 We can prove that for reasonable 
Ck ‘ \ (X, 
parameter values, we always have 
dy* - f - >0 
de 
8The reason that we make this assumption is that most empirical evidence suggests 
that p is much smaller than a. 
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which means larger externalities from average capital normally lead to higher 
long-run output levels when there are no externalities from labor input in 
production. When p is sufficiently large [p = 0.14)，c and x are sufficiently 
small {cr = 0.01，x = 0.01), dy*!de is negative. 
4.1.2 Case 2: 77 > 0 
77 > 0 means that there exist positive externalities from labor input in pro-
duction. Then 
！ = 已 如 ; . In(丑iJO • TT——、一 (1 广力、——^ 
de a ^ J ^ [£(1 + X ) + � ( 1 - … - 丑 ] 
The first term is positive and the third term is negative. The sign of dy* jde 
is then determined by that of IwBD'^ . 
‘ [(Qi—T� 
1 _ ” ) = In (印 ( 1 -批 ' + … • • > V z �a 1 - a 1 - a 
< L. J / 
Below are two numerical examples. 
Example 6\ We set the parameter values as 
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Oi p X V 
0.3 0.0045 1 1 0.1 




which means for some reasonable parameter values, larger externalities from 
average capital can lead to higher long-run output levels when there are 
positive externalities from labor input in production. 
Example 7: We set the parameter values as 
d p X V 
0.3 0.0045 0.2 0 0.45 
Then we have 
字 < 0 
de 
which means for some reasonable parameter values, larger externalities from 
average capital can also lead to lower long-run output level when there are 
positive externalities from labor input in production. We note that in this 
example, r] = 0.45 is relatively large and has made the necessary condition 
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(92) for indeterminacy to happen, i.e., 
7] + (l — a ) � l + x 
where 77 + (1 - a) = 1.15 > 1 + x = 1. 
4.1.3 Case 3: 77 < 0 
77 < 0 means that there exist negative externalities from labor input in pro-
duction. Then 
忙 = 已 • ln(5D”） —(1 + 力 . 
de a \> ^ J 、 乂 + 
The first term is positive and the third term is negative. The sign of dy*/d€ 
is then determined by that of InBD”. 
= In ( � … • . ^ _ ^ 
a 1 - a 1 - a 
\ L � 






which means larger externalities from average capital normally lead to higher 
long-run output levels when there are negative externalities from labor input 
in production. When p is sufficiently large [p 二 0.14)，a and x are sufficiently 
small (cr = 0.01, x = 0), dy*/de is negative. 
4.2 A Model with a Non-separable Felicity Function 
In this subsection, we assume the felicity function to be non-separable, all 
other settings unchanged. The optimization problem of the representative 
agent is then described by 
rnax.厂(c�:y—Vt dt (95) 
subject to 
kt = k^ll'^'KlVl - Ct 
Assumption 8: (1) 0 < 没 1; (2) 0 < a < 1，0 < 1 - a < 1; (3) 
� 0 and is a positive constant] (4) £ is the externality from average capital 
in production, and rj is the externality from average labor in production. 
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We construct the current-value Hamiltonian as 
H = ( c ^ - � ; ” ) + A. - cO (96) 
First-order conditions are (in eqilibrium Kt = h, Lt = k) 
T ^ ( r ^ ) � t (97) 
= x,{l - (98) 
c < + — ( 9 9 ) 
At 
together with the goods market clearing condition 
kt = A;f+%i+”—" — ct (100) 
and the transversality condition. The system can be described by the follow-
ing two differential equations 
At 
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kt 二 “ - Ct 
At the steady state, we have 
y* = c* = -k* (101) 
a 
p = (102) 
/c*"+Ti+”—" - c* (103) 
We solve out I* as 
where in order to guarantee positive I*, we need 
1 —没a > 0 (105) 
Substituting equation (104) into equation (102) and then (101), we solve 
out y* as 




n = l ； „ ) > 0 
a _ 1 — da 
By differentiating y* with respect to s in equation (106), we have 
dy* 1 _ g i v 由 - 1 
a-{-e-l' {a + 6-iy � U 
It is easy to see that dy*/de and {a + s - 1) have opposite signs, and that 
the sign of dy*/de is unrelated to labor externalities, 77, in the production 
function. We thus have the following two results. 
(i) Assume that 
a + e < 1 (108) 




which means larger externalities from average capital can lead to higher long-
run output levels when e is sufficiently small to make a + e < 1. 
(ii) Assume that 
a + 1 (109) 
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Then we have 
dy* < 0 
as 
which means larger externalities from average capital can lead to lower long-
run output levels when e is sufficiently big to make a + e � 1 . 
5 Conclusion 
In this thesis we consider the one-sector neoclassical growth models with 
consumption and/or capital externalities. The externalities are modeled by 
assuming that the production function and/or the discount rate depend on 
average consumption and/or average capital. 
First, we examine the dynamic properties of a one-sector neoclassical 
growth model with both consumption and capital externalities. We set up 
a serials of models in which both externalities from average capital and av-
erage consumption are considered. We find that in the presence of both 
externalities prefect-foresight eqilibrium may not be unique, and that local 
indeterminacy can arise. 
Second, we investigate the effects of consumption externalities on short-
run and long-run individual consumption levels. We show that if average 
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consumption is incorporated into the felicity function, jealousy may induce 
the agent to consume more in the short-run and leads to a higher level of 
individual consumption in the long-run. However, when incorporating aver-
age consumption into the rate of time preference, jealousy induces the agent 
to consume more in the short-run and leads to a lower level of individual 
consumption in the long-run. 
Finally, we examine the effect of capital externalities on long-run output 
levels. First, we investigate a case with a separable felicity function and find 
that when the production is subject to positive externalities from average 
labor input in the economy, larger externalities from average capital do not 
necessarily lead to higher long-run output levels. However, when the produc-
tion is subject to non-positive externalities from average labor input, larger 
externalities from average capital normally lead to higher long-run output 
levels. Second, if the felicity function is non-separable, we find the effect of 
capital externalities on long-run output levels is determined by the magni-
tude of capital externalities, and is qualitively unrelated to labor externalities 
in the production function. 
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Appendix: Figure 1 
Ct个 
saddle path ((X2) saddle path (cci) 
b / _ 
丁 c,=0，（ai) 
^ ^ kt =0，⑷ 
J ^ ^ / i 一 ， ⑷ ^ 
kt 
/ 
Assume that ai > 012 in Figure 1. 
Ai is the equilibrium saddle point corresponding to a!; A2 is the equilibrium saddle point 
corresponding to a � . It is easy to see that at point Ai, the equilibrium value c* is larger 
than that at point A2. 
Saddle path (aO corresponds to ai； saddle path � corresponds to 012. At any point in the 
short-run, say ky, the individual consumption level at B2 is higher than that at Bi, since 
saddle path (012) is above saddle path (ai). 
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Appendix: Figure 1 
Ct牛 
saddle path (ai) 
ct=0, (ai) 
^ s a d d l e path ((X2) 
kt = 0，⑷ 
一 ， ⑷ 象 
~ k v kt 
Assume that a! > 012 in Figure 2. 
Ai is the equilibrium saddle point corresponding to ai； A2 is the equilibrium saddle point 
corresponding to a!. It is easy to see that at point Ai’ the equilibrium value c* is larger 
than that at point A2. 
Saddle path (oti) corresponds to ai； saddle path � corresponds to 012. At any point in the 
short-run, say kv, the individual consumption level at Bi is higher than that at B2, since 
saddle path (ai) is above saddle path (0x2). 
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Appendix: Figure 1 
\ saddle path (aO saddle path (>2) 
f Q=0，(a2) 
0 ‘ kv kt 
I 
Assume that ai > aj in Figure 3. 
Ai is the equilibrium saddle point corresponding to ai； A2 is the equilibrium saddle point 
corresponding to 012. It is easy to see that at point A2, the equilibrium value c* is larger 
than that at point Ai. 
Saddle path (oti) corresponds to ai； saddle path (0x2) corresponds to aj. At any point in the 
short-run, say ky, the individual consumption level at Bi is higher than that at B2, since 
saddle path (ai) is above saddle path (aa). 
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